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INTRODUCTION

On February 2, 1958, Milwaukee city police officer Thomas
Grady shot and killed 23-year-old Daniel Bell.1
Officer Grady
immediately attempted to cover up the incident, enlisting the help of a
fellow officer to place a knife in Daniel's hand and concoct a fictional
account of the event. 2 It was only years later, in 1978, that an
investigation revealed the true circumstances of Mr. Bell's death. 3 A
year after this discovery, the estate of Daniel's father, Dolphus Bell,
instituted an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the shooting
was unconstitutionally, racially motivated, and the death of Daniel
Bell deprived him of his constitutionally protected liberty interest in
4
the companionship of his child.
Dolphus Bell's suit raises two important constitutional issues.
First, does the Constitution protect Dolphus Bell's relationship with
1.
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1214-15 (7th Cir. 1984).
2.
Id. at 1216.
3.
Id. at 1223.
4.
Id. at 1224. The Seventh Circuit held that Dolphus Bell's section 1983 claims survived
his death under Wisconsin statutory and case law. Id. at 1241-42.
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his adult son from undue state interference? Second, assuming such a
relationship is protected, did the police officers' conduct violate
Dolphus Bell's constitutional rights even though their conduct was
directed at his son? The Courts of Appeals have grappled with both
questions and have reached divergent results. This Note addresses the
circuit split with regard to the first issue: whether a parent has a
constitutionally protected interest in the companionship of her adult
child. 5
Parents of adult children allegedly injured by government
conduct often have pursued independent substantive due process
claims for violations of their parental interests. 6 The circuits have
struggled in applying the amorphous doctrine of substantive due
process to these claims. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from depriving individuals of "life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." 7 The Supreme Court
has expanded individual rights in personal matters largely in the
name of substantive due process.8 The Court typically describes
substantive due process rights as those falling within a zone of privacy
with which the state may not interfere, absent a compelling reason. 9
The circuits have split over whether a parental liberty interest
in the companionship of an adult child should be included within this
constitutionally protected zone of privacy. The Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have included the parental liberty interest within the zone, 10
whereas the First, District of Columbia, and Third Circuits have
denied the underlying right.'1 This Note attempts to resolve the
circuit split. Part II looks to Supreme Court precedent on the
5.
The focus of this Note on the first issue is not meant to diminish the importance of the
question of what sorts of conduct offend the Due Process Clause, but such a broad topic is beyond
the scope of this Note.
6.
See, e.g., Strandberg, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986); Bell, 746 F.2d at 1242-45.
7.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8.
See, e.g., John P. Safranek & Stephen J. Safranek, Licensing Liberty: The SelfContradictionsof Substantive Due Process, 2 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 231, 232 (1998).
9.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting that the "liberty" protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy."); see also Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l,, 431
U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (noting that personal decisions, relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and childrearing and education fall within the zone of
privacy protected by the Due Process Clause); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (noting
that the Court has recognized that "zones of privacy" may be created by more specific
constitutional guarantees or by the substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment and
impose limits upon government power).
10. Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 748; Bell, 746 F.2d at 1245; see also Trujillo v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Santa Fe County, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 1985).
11. McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 829 (3d Cir. 2003); Butera v. Dist. of Columbia, 235
F.3d 637, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1986).
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Constitution and family rights. This section pays special attention to
the doctrinal underpinnings of substantive due process and then
discusses how the Court has applied these underpinnings in defining
the scope of familial autonomy rights. Part III analyzes the circuit
split at issue. It begins by looking at the decisions of the Seventh and
Ninth circuits. These circuits have recognized the underlying
12
constitutional right, but they have done so for different reasons.
Part III then focuses on the decisions of the First, D.C., and Third
Circuits, which have rejected a parental liberty interest in the
companionship of an adult child. Part IV concludes by arguing that
the Due Process Clause protects a parent's interest in the
companionship of her adult child. It argues that the parental liberty
interest, which protects the "interest of a parent in the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children,"'13 does not arbitrarily disappear once children become
adults. Out of necessity, the scope and extent of the right changes as
children mature into adulthood; however, a parent still retains her
interest in the companionship and care of her children. Such an
outcome is dictated by a logical reading of precedent and this country's
tradition of according special rights to and placing obligations on
individuals by virtue of the parent-child relationship.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR FAMILIAL AUTONOMY

In determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment accords a
fundamental liberty interest in a parent's right to enjoy or maintain
the continued companionship of her adult child, it is necessary to
delve into the nebulous arena of Supreme Court precedent on
constitutional protections of the family. Today, there is little doubt
that the Due Process Clause contains a substantive as well as a
procedural component, and the validity of substantive due process as a
means of protecting certain liberty interests not contained in the Bill
of Rights has been reaffirmed by the Court. 14 In general, the rights

12. See infra Part III.A.
13. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
14. Developments in the Law -- The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1167 (1980) [hereinafter The Constitution and the Family]. Jurists and scholars continue to
question the validity and/or the prudence of using the Due Process Clause as a source of
substantive rights. The legitimacy and precise contours of substantive due process are highly
controversial matters. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1986); compare Michael J. Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals,
and The Police Powers: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
689, 689 (1976) ("Substantive due process ... is a nightmare from which the Supreme Court
ought to awake.") with John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf"A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
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that the Court has found to be "fundamental" have tended to be in the
related areas of marriage, 15 childbearing, 16 and childrearing, 17 which
the Court generally has treated as falling within the broad category of
18
a right to privacy.
In carving out fundamental, unenumerated rights, the Court
has relied heavily on cases suggesting that family life is a uniquely
private enclave, to be scrupulously protected against governmental
intrusion. 19 However, the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the
right to establish a family and other intimate relationships "reveal its
failure to develop a coherent methodology in the face of new demands
for constitutional protection." 20
Without a cogent framework to
determine which rights are fundamental and which are not, lower
courts continually split over the question of what the category of

YALE L. J. 920, 920-49 (1973) [hereinafter Ely, Crying Wol] (explaining the need to identify and
define the constitutional values underlying the concept of unenumerated fundamental rights).
However, there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on the Due
Process Clause as a source of substantive rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (overturning a Virginia miscengation law
because it arbitrarily deprived couples of a fundamental liberty, the freedom to marry, protected
by the Due Process Clause); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (overturning an
Oregon statute requiring parents to send their children to public schools because it interfered
with a parent's Due Process right to make decisions regarding her child's education); see also
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
15. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
16. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441, 454-55 (1972) (affirming the First
Circuit's overturning of a doctor's conviction that was based on his giving contraceptives to an
unmarried woman); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (finding unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute that sterilized persons
that were "habitual criminals").
17. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); see also supra note 14.
18. EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, & PRIVACY: TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 159 (1996). Substantive due process not only protects fundamental

rights but also safeguards citizens from wholly arbitrary governmental action affecting
nonfundamental liberty and property interests. Accordingly, a plaintiff can raise a viable
substantive due process claim, even in the absence of a fundamental right. See Pearson v. City of
Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215-23 (6th Cir. 1992); Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of
Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407-12 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., Doody v. Sinaloa Lake
Owners Ass'n, Inc., 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311,
1326 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
19. Note, On Privacy: ConstitutionalProtectionfor Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670,
738 (1973) [hereinafter On Privacy].
20. KEYNES, supra note 18, at 173 (arguing that the Court has failed to provide a rationale
for affording unenumerated rights greater protection than unenumerated liberty and property
rights). On the need to identify and define the constitutional values underlying the concept of
unenumerated fundamental rights, see Ely, Crying Wolf, supra note 14, at 920-49.
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family rights includes. 21 In large part, the circuit split at issue in this
Note is a result of this failure and a lack of consensus on the scope and
nature of the Court's decisions on fundamental liberties.
This Section provides the necessary background and analysis
for a coherent assessment of the liberty interest at issue in the circuit
split. It does not attempt to decipher"or suggest an overarching
framework for adjudging whether or not a liberty interest is
fundamental, but instead it engages in the less-Herculean task of
analyzing how the Court has defined the scope of parental and
familial liberty. In Part A of this Section, the Note discusses the
doctrinal underpinnings of substantive due process, paying particular
attention to the role tradition and contemporary validity play in
determining whether a right is fundamental. Part B chronicles
important Supreme Court decisions on substantive due process and
the family. This part deals only with the fundamental right and how
the Court established it; it does not delve further into the standard of
review the Court uses in determining whether state conduct violates
22
due process.
A. Finding UnenumeratedRights in the Due Process Clause
Substantive due process rights typically have flowed from three
sources. 23 Two of those sources derive from the Constitution itself,
including the Bill of Rights and the constitutional structure. 24 The
third and most controversial source has been a "nonsource," what one
scholar described as "naked judicial judgment that a liberty is of

21. On Privacy, supra note 19, at 738-39. The circuit split at issue in this Note, discussed
infra Part IV, is an example of one such area where courts have split over the question of what
the privacy protected by the Due Process Clause includes. By and large, the difference in
opinions is how to define tradition. See infra Part II.A.1.
22. Many commentators think of substantive due process as fitting within a two-tiered
framework. Richard J. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 314 (1993). Governmental intrusions on
fundamental rights are subject to strict or exacting scrutiny. Id. Infringement on
nonfundamental liberty and property interests are scrutinized under rational basis review to
assure that the infringements are rationally related to legitimate government purposes. Id. at
315. For a discussion of how the Court has not adhered to a two-tiered framework, see id. at 314325; see also Note, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term; Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 210-20
(1992) (arguing that the "Court has neither adhered in practice to its formal framework for
analyzing substantive due process claims nor applied a coherent standard of scrutiny in its
departures.").
23. Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV.
981, 1030 (1978-79).
24. Id. at 1030-31. The principal source of liberty has been the Bill of Rights, incorporated
in the Due Process Clause. A second source of substantive liberties has been the constitutional
structure and the values that structure implies. Id.
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special constitutional magnitude, despite a lack of persuasive linkage
with structural or textually identified values." 25 Virtually all decisions
falling in this category protect family relationships, actual or
potential. 26 The contemporary view of substantive due process was
fashioned by Justices John Marshall Harlan and Byron White in
Griswold v. Connecticut.2 7 Though disagreeing on the scope of the
liberty that due process protects, both Justices believed that the
Fourteenth Amendment was broad enough to include a married
couple's decision to prevent conception. 28 Since Griswold, the Due
Process Clause has served as the Supreme Court's "chosen vessel" for
the protection of unenumerated rights. 29 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has created no theory or methodology for reviewing liberty
interests. 30 Instead, it has tended to recognize a right as fundamental
only when a strong showing can be made to support it, typically
31
including a demonstration that the right has a basis in tradition.
The Court consistently has turned to tradition as a source of
previously unrecognized rights. 32 Justice Goldberg, though identifying
the Ninth Amendment as a source of unenumerated rights, succinctly
provided guidance in determining which liberty interests should be
regarded as fundamental:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases
in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the traditions
and [collective] conscience of our people to determine whether a principle is so rooted
[there] as to be ranked as fundamental. The inquiry is whether a right involved is of
such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles
33
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.

The Court's evaluation of a liberty claim should entail a search
"for values deeply embedded in the society, values treasured by both
past and present, values behind which the society and its legal system
have unmistakably thrown their weight. '34 Therefore, the claim must
25. Id. at 1032. Many scholars and jurists have criticized the expansion of this so-called
judge-made law, arguing that it amounts to a judicial invalidation of the outcome of ordinary
political processes and is therefore undemocratic and "presumptively counters the explicit
premise around which we have organized our relationship to government." Id.; see also BICKEL,
supra note 14, at 19. Another common criticism is that the process of creating or finding
fundamental rights is "purely and inescapably subjective." Lupu, supra note 23, at 1035-36.
26. Id. at 1032.
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); KEYNES, supra note 18, at 154-55.
28. Id. at 155.
29. The Constitutionand the Family, supranote 14, at 1174-75.
30. Id. at 1176-77.
31. Id. at 1176.
32. Id. at 1177.
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493-94 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
34. Lupu, supra note 23, at 1040.
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satisfy two related tests. First, American institutions historically must
35
have recognized the liberty claim as one of paramount stature.
Second, contemporary society must value the asserted liberty at a
36
level of high priority.
1. Tradition
When a purported liberty interest is brought before the Court,
the Court explicitly has inquired into the interest's foundation in
tradition. 37 Much of the tradition inquiry centers on whether the
value historically has been regarded as falling within the province of
individual freedom or as an action upon which society's interference is
improper. 38 There are a number of ways in which history may show
recognition of a fundamental liberty, such as lengthy records of
common or statutory law protecting the interest, 39 a conscious and
purposeful tradition of nonregulation, 40 strong currents of respect for
the liberty by the progenitors and architects of American
institutions, 4 1 or recognition of the interest in political, moral, and
historical writings. 42 Where the existence of the requisite tradition is
self-evident, the Court often has contented itself with relying on
statements made in past judicial opinions as indicia of an interest's
43
stature as fundamental.
The use of tradition as a source for fundamental rights has
been criticized because of the inherent elasticity of the concept.
Professor John Hart Ely noted that "people have come to understand

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1041.
37. The Constitution and the Family, supra note 14, at 1178; see, e.g., Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that the constitutional right to
live together as a family extended beyond the nuclear family because the extended family
traditionally played a role in providing sustenance and security); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 383-84 (1978) (recognizing as fundamental the right to enter into the matrimonial state
because of the long history of appreciation of the fundamental nature of marriage); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 486 (protecting contraceptive privacy in marriage because of the respect for marital
privacy and the high status of marriage in American society); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401-02 (1923) (finding the protection of parental autonomy linked to the American culture's
placement of primary childbearing responsibility on parents rather than the community).
38. The Constitution and the Family, supra note 14, at 1179.
39. Lupu, supra note 23, at 1044.
40.

Id.

41. Id.
42. The Constitution and the Family, supra note 14, at 1179 n.129.
43. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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that 'tradition' can be invoked in support of almost any cause." 44 He
notes that the problems that arise from relying on tradition involve
those of cultural geography, time, competing tradition, and levels of
generality. 45 Some scholars have attempted to provide a workable
solution to those problems Professor Ely identified. 46 However, the
Supreme Court has yet to develop and apply a consistent definition of
47
"tradition" in the substantive due process context.
2.

Contemporary Validity

A fundamental right, moreover, must be something in which
the American people continue to believe. That a right had been
regarded in the past to be vitally important will not suffice, in and of
itself, to elevate it to the stature of fundamental. 48 The Court will not
and should not recognize as fundamental a traditional value whose
status has been rejected by contemporary moral views. 49 Though
theoretically simple, in application, social consensus for a particular
50
liberty is difficult to measure, especially on a nationwide basis.
In cases involving parental rights, the Supreme Court typically
does not engage in a detailed examination of contemporary validity,
relying instead on the fact that continued respect for the family has

44. John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term Foreword: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 39 (1978).
45. Lupu, supra note 23, at 1044. Professor Ely's criticism of the use of tradition in
formulating unenumerated, substantive rights centers on the inherent difficulty in defining
tradition; he points out that the key questions are: whose traditions, which era's traditions, and
which region's traditions control. Ely, supra note 44, at 39-40.
46. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 23, at 1045-47.
47. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-93 (1986) (noting the longstanding
legal tradition of criminalizing homosexual sodomy) with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568
(2003) ("At the outset it should be noted that there is no longstanding history in this country of
laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter."). Compare also Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("We refer to the most specific level at which a
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.") with
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) ("It is also tempting
... to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most
specific level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of law when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified... . But such a view would be inconsistent with our
law.").
48. The Constitution and the Family, supra note 14, at 1179.
49. Id. at 1179-80 (noting, as an example, that "it is unlikely that any historical showing
would convince the Court that [the fundamental right of whites not to associate with blacks] [i] s
worthy of recognition today.").
50. Ely, supra note 44, at 37-39. As Professor Ira C. Lupu noted, "[iun a nation as
demographically diverse as this one, the favorite freedom of northern California may be shocking
sin to those in the Bible Belt." Lupu, supra note 23, at 1048.
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been uncontroversial. 51 Because it is difficult to demonstrate with any
degree of certainty the extent of social support for the family and the
importance of protecting such a liberty from transient majorities, the
Court generally has regarded the traditions discussed in previous
cases as presumptively valid. 52 That presumption, however, would not
be valid if social consensus clearly called into question the tradition's
53
validity.
B. The Supreme Court's Decisions on Family Relations
One of the most striking expansions of the substantive due
process doctrine in recent years has been in the area of family
relations. The Supreme Court has regarded as fundamental the right
of parents to raise their children in a certain way, as well as the right
of family members to reside together. 54 These decisions may be traced
to a concern with protecting family life, 55 and the Court generally has
carved out these rights based on the profound tradition of and
contemporary respect for families. 56 The privacy rights the Court
57
regards as fundamental "give content to the American Dream."
From a more traditional, conservative viewpoint, the unimpeded right
to establish a home and raise children is essential to the pursuit of
happiness. 58
This Part reviews many of the Supreme Court's
landmark decisions carving out unenumerated rights in the area of
family relations. Broken into three subsections, this Part first
analyzes the cases relating to child-rearing. It then looks at cases
involving the natural father's attempt to assert parental rights over
his child. Finally, this Part examines the Court's decision in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, where the Court found a fundamental right of
family members to reside together.

51.

The Constitutionand the Family, supra note 14, at 1180.

52.

Id. at 1180 n.134.

53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 494 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000) (plurality opinion). State interference with these
rights will be tolerated only where the "burden is necessary to promote a 'compelling' state
interest." Fallon, supra note 22, at 314.
55. On Privacy, supra note 19, at 738; see also supra Part II.A.
56. The Constitutionand the Family,supra note 14, at 1180.
57. On Privacy, supra note 19, at 739.
58. Id.
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1. Childrearing
The Supreme Court long has recognized that parents have a
constitutional right to raise their children without unjustified state
interference. 59 This right was established over eighty years ago in
Meyer v. Nebraska, when Justice McReynolds, writing for the Court,
struck down a Nebraska state law prohibiting the instruction of
60
foreign languages to children who had not passed the eighth grade.
The defendant, a parochial school teacher, was arrested for teaching
German to 10-year-old students in violation of the law. 6 1 Though the
Court relied in part on the children's liberty interest in acquiring
knowledge and the teacher's liberty interest in practicing that
occupation, the Court also concluded that the law impeded on a
parent's right to control her child, which the Due Process Clause
protected from undue state interference. 62 The parental liberty
interest recognized and defined in Meyers included the "power of
parents to control the education of their own." 63 Though observing
that communal childrearing "has been deliberately approved by men
of great genius," Justice McReynolds noted that "our institutions rest"
on a different notion, namely the role of the nuclear family in raising
the child. 64 Justice McReynolds argued that the nuclear family is
essential to maintaining both the "letter and spirit of the
65
Constitution."
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court
explicitly recognized that the parental liberty interest has
independent status. 66 Confronted with a challenge to an Oregon
statute requiring parents to send their children to public schools, a
unanimous court declared it to be "entirely plain that the ... [law

59. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (invalidating a requirement that
parents send their children to public schools, holding that "the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of their children under their control" includes the right to
send their child to a private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (striking
down a state law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to children who had not
completed eighth grade because the law impermissibly interfered with "the power of parents to
control the education of their own [children)").
60. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
61. Id. at 396.
62. Id. at 401.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 402. The Court noted the ancient practice of communal childrearing, citing Plato's
recommendation that "children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor
any child his parent." Id. at 401-02. The Court also explained the Spartan practice of removing
boys from their families at age seven to be raised, trained, and educated by official guardians. Id.
65. Id.
66. The Constitutionand the Family, supra note 14, at 1351.
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requiring compulsory public school attendance] unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control." 67 Such a
liberty interest encompasses the right of parents to send their children
to private or parochial schools. 68 Again writing for the Court, Justice
McReynolds used rather lofty terms to deny the state's power "to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only."6 9 In fact, it was not only the right but the "high
duty" of parents to recognize and prepare their children for "additional
obligations." 70 The Court did not engage in a lengthy discourse of
tradition, as it did in Meyer, but instead relied on Meyer as
71
establishing the parent's fundamental liberty interest.
The Meyer and Pierce decisions are viewed together as
establishing constitutional protection for a parental liberty interest, a
right which the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld in ad hoc
72
review of state regulations affecting the parent-child relationship.
Because of the piecemeal nature of the Supreme Court review, the
scope of the parental liberty interest remains unclear. Since Meyer
and Pierce, the Court has defined the parental liberty interest as a
constellation of various rights; 73 however, it has not been uniform in
identifying which rights are part and parcel of the liberty.
In the 1944 case Prince v. Massachusetts,the Court cited Meyer
and Pierce for the "cardinal" proposition that "the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither

67.

Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).

68. Id. at 534. Because one of the plaintiffs was a Military Academy, the Court rested its
opinion on Due Process grounds; it could have undoubtedly relied on the First Amendment if the
case involved only parochial schools.
69. Id. at 535. This language reiterates Justice McReynolds's rejection, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, of Plato's contention that children should be raised communally by the state. Here,
Justice McReynolds shows his elevated regard for individualism, the inherent nature of personal
rights, and the importance of such traditional institutions as the family. KEYNES, supra note 18,
at 160 (citing JAMES EDWARD BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES CLARK
MCREYNOLDS 131 (1992)).

70.

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.

71.

Id. at 534.

72. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (statute permitting any
person to petition for visitation with a child); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state law
requiring school attendance until the age of sixteen); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1967)
(state regulation of sale of "girlie" magazines to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (state regulation of child labor laws).
73. Compare Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (noting that the parental liberty
interest included the right to "companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children.") with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting that a parent
has a fundamental right in controlling the care and custody of her child).
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supply nor hinder."74 In Prince, the Court refused to strike down a
state law prohibiting minors from selling merchandise in public places
as violative of the parental liberty interest, finding the state's interest
in protecting children compelling. 75
The majority painstakingly
emphasized the narrowness of its decision by stressing the importance
76
of the parental liberty interest.
Seventeen years later, in Ginsberg v. New York, the Court
again identified the parental liberty interest as entailing a parent's
right to direct the "care, custody, and nurture" of her child. 77 In
Ginsberg, the defendant appealed his conviction for selling
pornography to a minor in violation of state law, and the Court
rejected his argument that the state law infringed on the right to rear
one's child, since the law only prohibited the sale of pornography and a
78
parent could purchase it for her child if she so desired.
More recently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Burger Court
considered the application of the state's compulsory education law as
applied to the Amish, a group whose religious tenets prohibit
education beyond the eighth grade. 79 The Court held the application
of the law to the Amish unconstitutional, relying, inter alia, on the
parental liberty interest.8 0 The Court did not seek to increase the
scope of the liberty interest but instead explained that Meyer and
Pierce conclusively held that the parental liberty interest included a
parent's right to direct "the religious upbringing and education" of her
81
children.
In Troxel v. Granville, the Rehnquist Court weighed in on the
scope of the liberty interest that parents have in rearing their
children. 2 Though the precise limits of the Court's decision are
unclear because no position garnered a majority, at least six members
of the current Court recognized that a parent has a fundamental
liberty interest in controlling the care and custody of her child, and
these Justices agreed that this liberty interest is expansive enough to
include a parent's right to make decisions concerning the visitation
and association of her child.8 3
74. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
75. Id. at 166, 170.
76. The Constitutionand the Family, supra note 14, at 1351.
77. Ginsberg,390 U.S. at 639.
78. Id.
79. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 213-14.
82. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 66 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 77 (Souter, J. concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
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Writing on behalf of the plurality, Justice O'Connor found a
Washington state law that allowed "any person" to petition the state
courts for child visitation rights at "any time" to be unconstitutional as
applied.8 4 The state court had relied on the law to grant more
expansive visitation rights to a child's paternal grandparents than the
child's mother wished.8 5 Justice O'Connor identified the "interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children" and
concluded that the state court's decision had impermissibly intruded
86
on this interest.
Both Justices Thomas and Souter concurred in the judgment.
Justice Thomas found the Washington statute to be facially
unconstitutional based on the Court's precedent in Pierce, and he
chastised the plurality and Justice Souter for failing to apply the strict
scrutiny standard to strike down the law.8 7 In Justice Thomas's view,
the state failed to articulate a legitimate-much less a compellinginterest for interfering with the parent's right regarding visitation
with third parties. 88 Justice Souter similarly found the Washington
statute to be facially unconstitutional. He found the statute to be
impermissibly broad because it allowed a judge to grant visitation
rights to "any person" who petitioned the court "at any time," based
solely on the "best interest standard."8 9 The statute completely
disregarded a fundamental right, and therefore, Justice Souter
concluded, it was unconstitutional. 90
Justice Stevens took a different approach. Though he would
have remanded the case to the Washington Supreme Court to construe
the statute in a manner consistent with due process, he importantly
defined what he perceived to be the precise component of the parental
liberty interest at issue. 9 1 Justice Stevens concluded: "My colleagues
are of course correct to recognize that the right of a parent to maintain
a relationship with his or her child is among the interests included
most often in the constellation of liberties protected through the
Fourteenth Amendment," resting this conclusion on the Court's earlier
92
precedents on child-rearing.

84.
85.

Id. at 67-68 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 60 (plurality opinion).

86.

Id. at 65.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
at 77-79 (Souter, J., concurring).
at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 86-87.
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2. The Rights of the Natural Father
The constitutional right to rear one's child unfettered by
unnecessary governmental interference is not an automatic right
vested in a parent by virtue of blood relation. 93 While the parental
liberty interest exists outside the confines of the marital unit,
something more than a biological connection must be shown before the
Court will provide constitutional protection to a parent's right to "the
94
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her child."
Unlike the Supreme Court's decisions involving state regulations and
parental liberty interests, the cases that examine the rights of a
natural father are the decisions that are best suited to consider the
full scope of the parental liberty interest.
In the 1972 case Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court first
addressed the scope of the constitutional protection afforded to a
child's natural father who was not married to the mother. 95 Under
Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers became wards of the state
upon the death of the mother. 96 When the mother of the three
children involved in Stanley died, the state denied the children's
biological father custody, declared the children wards of the state, and
placed them with court-appointed guardians. 97 In striking down the
statute, the Court noted that "[t]he private interest here, that of a
man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants
98
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection."
The Court described the right at issue as that of a parent in the
"companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children." 99
Six years later the Court expounded on its Stanley decision in
Quilloin v. Walcott. 100 In that case, the Court considered the
constitutionality of Georgia's adoption laws as applied to deny a father
the authority to prevent adoption of his illegitimate child. 101 The

93. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 253-56 (1978) (holding that absent extrabiological ties to his child, a father was due only minimal procedural due process regarding the
adoption of the child by the child's stepfather).
94. Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
95. 405 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1972).
96. Id. at 646.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 651.
99. Id. at 657. The Court also invalidated the statute as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because only an unwed father was deprived of the right to
rear his children, whereas the unwed mother was presumed to be fit. Id. at 658.
100. Id. at 247.
101. Id. at 247.
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child's natural father never married the child's mother or established
a home, and the father had only on occasion visited his child. 10 2 When
the child's mother married, the stepfather sought to adopt the child,
with the mother's consent. The natural father, however, attempted to
block the adoption. 10 3 The Supreme Court held that "under the
circumstances of this case appellant's substantive rights were not
violated."' 0 4 Though recognizing the rights of the parents established
in Meyer, Stanley, Prince, and Yoder, the Court held that those rights
are not vested in a father who had never sought actual or legal
custody of his child. 10 5 The Court refused to break up a family unit
106
already in existence.
In Lehr v. Robertson, 0 7 the Court flushed out precisely when a
parent is afforded constitutional protection to rear her children free
from undue governmental interference. 08
The Court held that
"[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in
the rearing of his child,' his interest in personal contact with his child
acquires substantial protection under the due process clause [sic]."'10 9
Such a right requires more than the "the mere existence of a biological
link." 1 0 Under this rule, the plaintiff was not deprived of liberty
within the definition of the Due Process Clause, because he never
supported and rarely saw his child for the two years between her birth
and the adoption proceeding initiated by her stepfather."'
Most recently, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court considered
the constitutionality of a California law which created an irrebutable
presumption that the husband was the father of any child born into an

102. Id. at 251
103. Id. at 247
104. Id. at 254.
105. Id. at 255.
106. Id.
107. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
108. Between the decisions in Quilloin and Lehr, the Court considered a similar claim in
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). This case, while addressing the constitutional right of
a natural father to rear his children, was decided on equal protection grounds. In Caban, the
Court invalidated a state law that permitted only the unwed mother, not the unwed father, to
block an illegitimate child's adoption. Id. at 393-94. Both dissenting opinions, however,
addressed the question of when constitutional protection is afforded under the Due Process
Clause. Both Justice Stewart and Chief Justice Burger suggested that constitutional protection
is afforded when the parent establishes an enduring relationship with the child. Id. at 395-96
(Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (internal citation omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 262-63.
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existing marriage. 112 The plaintiff in this case fathered a child while
living with a woman who was separated from, but later reconciled
with, her husband, and the plaintiff sought to establish paternity and
visitation with his child. 113 The decisions in Stanley, Quilloin, and
Lehr suggested that the plaintiffs biological connection, coupled with
a demonstration that he assumed the responsibilities of rearing his
child, would accord the plaintiff a constitutional right to rear his child.
As one commentator explained, "if the clock had been stopped at any
time within the... twenty years" preceding the Michael H. decision,
"the plaintiff would have prevailed." 114 However, a plurality of the
court, led by Justice Scalia, held that the plaintiff did not have a
constitutional interest in his natural daughter, even if he could meet
the rule established in Lehr.115 In reaching this result, Justice Scalia
narrowly framed the liberty interest at stake as the right of a natural
father to assert parental rights over a child born into a woman's
existing marriage with another man. 116 In the plurality's view,
Stanley, Quilloin, and Lehr provided no support for the plaintiffs
constitutional claim. 117 Justice Scalia viewed those cases as standing
for the historic respect and sanctity traditionally accorded to the
relationships that develop within the unitary family.11 8 After such
interpretation of the case law, Justice Scalia held that the asserted
right was neither grounded in tradition nor contemporary values. 119
Scalia garnered the support of three other Justices for his
entire opinion, with the exception of a single footnote. In that footnote,
Scalia wrote only for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, declaring,
"We refer to the most specific level at which relevant tradition,
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified." 120
In two separate opinions, five justices specifically
rejected Scalia's pronouncement of how the Court has identified (or,
perhaps, should identify) the tradition implicated by the asserted

112. 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989) (plurality opinion).
113. Id. at 113-15.
114. Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 34 (1992).
115. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 (plurality opinion).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 122-24.
118. Id. at 123.
119. Id. at 126.
120. Id. at 127 n.6; see Rutherford, supra note 114, at 35-36 (discussing possible
interpretations of Justice Scalia's footnote); Elizabeth A. Hadad, Comment, Tradition and the
Liberty Interest: Circumscribing the Rights of the Natural Father, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 56
BROOK. L. REV. 291, 314-323 (1990) (criticizing Justice Scalia for failing to recognize
contemporary morals in his definition of the liberty interest at stake).
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interest. 12 1 Justice Brennan believed that, in this case, the Court
should have focused on the tradition of unwed fathers rearing their
children. 122 Clearly, once the right and tradition were defined in such
a manner, the Court's decision in Stanley would have been dispositive
123
in deciding the case in favor of the plaintiff.
That a majority of the Court directly repudiated the validity of
Justice Scalia's footnote in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey adds additional strength to Justice Brennan's
dissent in Michael H. In Casey, the Court noted: "It is also
to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those
tempting ....
practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected
against government interference by other rules of law when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified .... But such a view would be
inconsistent with our law." 124 The Michael H. plurality may have
defined tradition too narrowly, and consistent with the Casey decision,
Justice Brennan's dissent may be closer to the standard mandated by
due process as set forth in Casey.
3. Zoning and the Non-Nuclear Family
The cases set out in the preceding two subsections carved out a
liberty interest in the narrow confines of the nuclear family with
minor children. Confronted with the changing realities of the "typical"
American family, many questions remain regarding the scope of the
Due Process Clause outside the nuclear family. The Court on one
occasion has shown a willingness to expand the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment to include the extended family. In Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, the Supreme Court invalidated a city zoning
ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from residing with two
grandchildren who were cousins but permitted a grandmother to
reside with two grandchildren who were siblings. 125 East Cleveland
attempted to defend the zoning ordinance by arguing that the Court's
prior holding in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas was dispositive on the
issue.1 26 Belle Terre upheld the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
that prohibited three or more persons unrelated by blood or marriage

121. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (joined by Justice
Kennedy); id. at 138-141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun).
122. Id. at 138-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (internal
citation omitted).
125. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496-506 (1977) (plurality opinion).
126. Id. at 498.
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from living in the same single family house. 127 However, the Court
found Belle Terre to be inapposite. 128 The ordinance at issue in that
case affected only unrelated persons. 129 Unlike the ordinance at issue
in Belle Terre, East Cleveland's ordinance intruded on family life, and
the Court invalidated the statute because it believed that the right of
family members to live together was fundamental, even if the family
was extended, as opposed to nuclear.130
Speaking for the plurality, Justice Powell argued that "the
accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and
honored throughout our history,... supports a larger conception of
the family [than the nuclear family]."131 For both Justices Powell and
Brennan, the extended family was functionally equivalent to the
nuclear family, since both units fulfilled similar needs and were
deeply rooted in history and tradition. 132 It is through both the
nuclear and extended families that "we inculcate and pass down many
of our most cherished values, moral and cultural."'133 Moreover, the
extended family is vitally important in times of adversity for providing
mutual sustenance and maintaining or rebuilding a secure home
life.1 34 Accordingly, Justice Powell remarked that "unless we close our
eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family
have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of
these precedents to the family choice involved in this case."' 35 In this
regard, the decisions in Yoder, Ginsberg, Pierce, and Meyer provided
support for the conclusion that "the choice of relatives in this degree of
kinship to live together may not lightly be denied by the State."'1 36

127. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
128. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
129. Id.; Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 2.
130. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion).
131. Id. at 505.
132. KEYNES, supra note 18, at 174.
133. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04.
134. Id. at 505.
135. Id. at 501.
136. Id. at 505-06. Only Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun followed Powell's
analysis. With three Justices dissenting, the statute was invalidated because Justice Stevens
concurred on the grounds that the ordinance had no substantial relation to any state interest
and violated the plaintiffs property rights. See id. at 520-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). This suggests that one may not possess the right to reside with extended family if she
does not own, but rents or leases, her home.
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III. THE CIRCUITS SPLIT: Do PARENTS HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO THE COMPANIONSHIP OF THEIR ADULT CHILDREN?

The issue of whether the Due Process Clause affords a parental
interest in companionship with an adult child is unresolved. The
Supreme Court twice had the opportunity to rule on this issue;
however, it opted not to do so, holding on both occasions that certiorari
had been granted improvidently. 137 With no explicit guidance from
the Supreme Court, circuits have come down on both sides of the
issue. 138 Compounding the constitutional question in these decisions
is the fact that such claims generally do not arise in a more typical
substantive due process manner, in which courts address the
constitutionality of a state regulation that allegedly infringes on a
purported due process right. 139 Instead, this issue has arisen in the
context of tort suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the
plaintiff alleges that the defendants, acting under the color of state

137. Jones v. Hildebrant, 550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), cert. dismissed 432 U.S. 183 (1977);
Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981), cert. dismissed 456 U.S. 430 (1982).
138. Compare Standberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussed
further infra Part III.A.2) and Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Santa Fe County, 768 F.2d
1186, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 1985) (discussed infra in note 141) and Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746
F.2d 1205, 1245 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussed infra Part III.A.1) with McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d
820, 829 (3d. Cir. 2003) (discussed infra Part III.B.3) and Butera v. District of Columbia, 235
F.3d 637, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussed infra Part III.B.2) and Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 7
(1st Cir. 1986) (discussed infra Part III.B.1).
139. A constitutional tort appears to bear little resemblance to the typical substantive due
process case. Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of
Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201, 224-25 (1984). Substantive due process is typically
invoked as a defense against criminal prosecutions or similar government actions. Id. at 223.
However, certain claims for damages under section 1983 can be viewed as a substantive due
process claims because the plaintiff also challenges the constitutionality of government action.
Id. Professors Wells and Eaton argue that there are two differences between constitutional tort
damages and traditional substantive due process, neither of which are strong enough to
overshadow the similarities between them. Id. at 224-26. First, in the typical substantive due
process case, the plaintiff invokes substantive due process as a defense to threatened
government action. Id. at 225. However, in the tort context, the plaintiff has already been
injured, and his remedy is damages. Id. The difference, then, is that in the typical case the
plaintiff is kept whole, whereas in the constitutional tort case, the plaintiff is made whole. Id.
Second, in the more typical due process case, the state "seeks to impose some obligation on the
individual in further of the public good." Id. The individual in response argues that the Due
Process Clause "includes the right of autonomy in personal decisionmaking and the right of
families to be free of certain forms of state regulation." Id. The court's job is to choose between
the state's justification for the regulation and the individual's claim of personal or familial
autonomy. Id. at 226. By contrast, in the tort context, "the government actor has already injured
the individual in some way." Id. The individual does not seek to invoke personal or familial
autonomy as a "counterweight to governmental discretion." Id. Instead, he argues that the
government has already invaded his liberty. Id. Here, Wells and Eaton argue, the task of the
court is to "identify the circumstances in which these interests warrant constitutional
protection." Id.
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law, deprived her of her constitutional right to enjoy the
companionship of her adult child. Before considering the merits of
such section 1983 claims, the circuits have engaged in the threshold
inquiry of "whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an
140
actual constitutional right at all."'

In Part A, this Section analyzes the decisions of two circuitsthe Seventh and Ninth-which have answered the threshold question
in the affirmative, holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent's interest in the
companionship of her adult child and that such a deprivation is
actionable under section 1983.141 In Part B, this Section looks to the
decisions in the First, D.C., and Third Circuits holding that no such
right exists in the Constitution.
A. Expanding Substantive Due Process: The Seventh and Ninth
CircuitsProtect the Relationship Between a Parent and Her Adult
Child
In recognizing that a parent's interest in the companionship of
her adult child is constitutionally protected against unnecessary state
interference, courts generally have relied on Supreme Court precedent
on due process protection for the family. 142 While both the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits agree that the Due Process Clause protects a

140. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); see, e.g., Butera, 235 F.3d at 646; McCurdy,
352 F.3d at 825-26.
141. The Tenth Circuit, in Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188-89, also found the right of a parent to
enjoy the companionship of her adult child to be grounded in the Constitution. However, because
the Tenth Circuit rested its opinion on First Amendment grounds, Trujillo falls outside the
purview of this Note. The Trujillo court based its decision on the Supreme Court's decision in
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Id. at 1188. In Jaycees, the Court explained that the
First Amendment recognized that "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the state," and the Tenth Circuit
believed that this included family relationships. Id. at 617-18; Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188. The
court held, unlike the Bell court, that the First Amendment protection was broad enough to
include not only the relationship between parent and child but also the relationships among
siblings. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189-90; Bell, 746 F.2d at 1244-47. While recognizing the
underlying constitutional right, the court held that the plaintiffs were unable to recover under
section 1983 because they failed to allege that the defendants intended to interfere with their
intimate relationship with the decedent. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190.
142. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1242-53; Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F. 2d 588, 590, 593-95 (8th Cir. 1973)
(relying mainly on the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold v.Connecticut and Meyer v.
Nebraska to hold that " 'parenthood is a substantial interest of surpassing value and protected
from deprivation without due process of law' -- a fundamental legal right") (internal citation
omitted); Myers v. Rask, 602 F. Supp. 210, 211-13 (D. Colo. 1985) (relying on numerous Supreme
Court cases to find that parents have a constitutionally protected right to the continued life of
their 18-year-old son). For a more thorough discussion of the Supreme Court precedent upon
which these courts based their rulings, see supra Part II.B.
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parent's interest in the companionship of an adult child, the two
circuits differ as to both the underpinnings and scope of that right.
The Seventh Circuit has read Supreme Court precedent as providing
that a parent's right in the companionship, care, custody and control
of her child does not cease once the child reaches some defined age of
adulthood. 143 Therefore, the Circuit permits a parent to sue for the
deprivation of her right to rear her child, even if that child is, for
instance, twenty years of age. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
rejects the contention that Supreme Court precedent constitutionally
protects a parent's right to rear a child once the child reaches
adulthood, but it has found that precedent recognizes the parent-child
relationship as so fundamental that the state cannot arbitrarily
interfere with it, even when the child is an adult.144
1. The Seventh Circuit's Approach: Defining the Scope of the
Recognized Right to Rear a Child
The Seventh Circuit's seminal decision Bell v. City of
Milwaukee provided constitutional protection for the relationship
between a parent and her adult child. 145 On February 2, 1958, two
Milwaukee City police officers, Thomas Grady and Louis Krause,
stopped Bell in his car, apparently in the mistaken belief that Mr. Bell
fit the description of a man wanted for armed robbery. 146 Upon seeing
the officers, Mr. Bell jumped out of his car and began to run. 147 The
two officers pursued Bell and at one point, yelled "halt" and fired
several warning shots in the air. 148 Bell did not heed the officers'
warnings and continued to flee. Grady and Krause then
commandeered a car and pursued Daniel Bell. Upon approaching
Daniel Bell, both officers exited the car and proceeded on foot with
their revolvers in their hands. 149 Grady mounted a snow bank and
yelled at Bell to stop running. 150 Bell ran toward a house, and Grady,
running ahead of Krause, caught up with Bell. With a loaded revolver
in his right hand, Grady extended his right hand to grab Bell by the

143. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1245 ("[W]e are unpersuaded that a constitutional line based solely on
the age of the child should be drawn.").
144. Standberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1986).
145. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
146. Id. at 1215. It was suggested that Grady and Krause, both of whom were Caucasian,
began to pursue Daniel Bell because he was African-American. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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shoulder, and as he did so, the revolver discharged, fatally hitting
5
Daniel Bell in the back.' '
Following the shooting, Grady and Krause engaged in a coverup of the incident. 152 They placed a knife in Daniel Bell's hand and
concocted a fictional account of the event. 153 Grady and Kraus claimed
that, when Daniel Bell jumped out of the automobile, he yelled to
them, "You won't catch me, I'm a holdup man," and that he was armed
with the knife. 154 Both officers maintained that Grady was some
distance from Bell when the gun discharged. 155 However, this
statement conflicted with another policeman's report of the incident,
which estimated that the shooting occurred at a close range. 156 In
1978, Krause told the District Attorney that he and Grady had lied
about what occurred during the Bell shooting in 1958.157 Krause wore
a wiretap and engaged Grady in conversation over the telephone,
where Grady admitted to planting the knife but maintained that the
158
shooting was accidental.
In 1979, Daniel Bell's father, Dolphus Bell, instituted an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the death of Daniel Bell deprived
him of his constitutionally protected liberty interest in continued
association with his child. 159 Dolphus Bell alleged that the City of
Milwaukee, Grady, and two former members of the Milwaukee police
department, acting under the color of state law, deprived him of this
right without due process of law, thus entitling him to damages under
section 1983.160 In finding such a liberty interest to be included in the
Due Process Clause and permitting the section 1983 action to be
maintained, the Seventh Circuit examined the Supreme Court's
decisions outlining the "parameters of the constitutional protection
afforded the parent-child relationship."'16 1 Though Daniel Bell was
twenty-three years old when he was killed, the Court expressly
refused to draw "a constitutional line based solely on the age of the

151. Id.
152. Id. at 1215-22.
153. Id. at 1216
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1218.
157. Id. at 1223.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1224. Dolphus Bell was actually deceased at the time the claim was brought. His
estate brought the claim on his behalf. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that Dolphus Bell's section
1983 claims survived his death under Wisconsin statutory and case law. Id. at 1241-42.
160. Id. at 1224.
161. Id. at 1243.
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child." 162 The Court found that, under the facts of the case, Dolphus
Bell's interest "in the companionship, care, custody, and management"
of the child did not magically disappear once Daniel Bell reached
adulthood. 163 The Court noted that, at the time of his death, Daniel
Bell was unmarried and had no children and that Dolphus Bell was
"his immediate family."'164 Moreover, there was substantial testimony
as to the warm and close relationship between Daniel and Dolphus
Bell.165
The Seventh Circuit's holding in this case does not carve out a
new fundamental right; rather, the court attempted to define the
scope of the parental liberty interest established in Myers, Pierce,
Yoder, and Troxel. The court concluded that a parent's liberty interest
in the companionship and care of her child does not cease at some
arbitrary date, such as a statutorily-defined age of adulthood. In this
vein, the court's holding is in line with the more generally accepted,
though contested, practice of allowing a parent to sue under section
66
1983 for the deprivation of her right to rear her child.
That the Bell court defined the scope of a parent's right to rear
her child without creating a new liberty outside that right is
supported by the court's refusal to extend constitutional protection to
the relationship among siblings. The court denied the section 1983
claim brought by Daniel Bell's siblings, premised on the deprivation of
their purported constitutional interest in the companionship of their
brother.167 No Supreme Court precedent spoke directly to the claim
the siblings brought. 16 The court noted that, while some Supreme
Court decisions have protected the family unit, the vast majority of
cases focused on "the parent's constitutional right to raise, associate
with, and to make decisions affecting the family."1 6 9 The court
162. Id. at 1245.
163. Id. at 1245 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. For cases permitting redress under section 1983 claims for injuries to parties whose
family members have been killed as a result of official state action, thus recognizing
constitutional protection of an individual's fundamental right to the companionship of her
family, see Estate of Bailey v. York County, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985); Mattis v. Schnarr, 502
F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961); Jones v. McElroy, 429
F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Smith v. Wickline, 396 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Galiindo v.
Brownell 255 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Cal. 1966); Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981). But
see, e.g., White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49, 51 (D. Colo. 1983) (holding the opposite); Jackson v.
Marsh, 551 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (D. Colo. 1982) (same); Ealey v. City of Detroit, 375 N.W.2d 435,
442 (Mich. 1985) (same).
167. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1245-47.
168. Id. at 1245.
169. Id.
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admitted that Moore, which protected the right of the extended family
to live together,1 70 provided some support to the siblings' claim, but
without more analogous precedent, it refused to protect as
171
constititional the relationship between siblings.
The Bell court found the time at which the parent-child
relationship loses constitutional protection to be dependent on various
factors. First, a court should assess whether or not a child is still a
member of his parent's family. In looking at this factor, a court should
look at whether the child has married and whether the child has
children of his own. If the child has not formed his own family unit,
the parents presumably still possess their constitutional interest in
the upbringing of that child. Second, the Bell decision suggests that an
examination of the nature of the parent-child relationship is also
necessary in determining whether a parent has a cause of action
under section 1983 for the deprivation of the parent-child relationship.
The court looked at the warm relationship between Dolphus and
Daniel Bell. Perhaps other inquiries into the nature of the parentchild relationship would focus on not only the emotional relationship
72
but also the financial relationship between parent and child. 1
Though the Bell court did not specify how lower courts should
apply these factors in determining whether the parent-child
relationship is constitutionally protected, at least one district court in
the Seventh Circuit believed that the determinative issue is whether
the child became a part of another family unit. 73 In Russ v. Watts,
the Northern District of Illinois considered whether parents could
bring a section 1983 claim for the deprivation of their relationship
with their adult son, Robert Russ. 74 Robert Russ was shot and killed

170. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also
discussion supra Part II.B.3.
171. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1246-47.
172. Because many children remain financially dependent upon their parents into adulthood,
the financial relationship may be an important consideration under the standard enunciated in
Bell. Id. at 1244-45. That children remain dependent on their parents into adulthood is reflected
in the federal tax structure. See I.R.S., PUBLICATION 501: EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTIONS,

AND FILING INFORMATION 14-18 (2003). For instance, if a child (or other dependent) is between
nineteen and twenty-four years of age, a full-time student for some part of each of five months
during the year, does not file a joint return with a spouse, meets citizenship requirements, earns
less than $2,800 in the year, and receives half of his support from his parent (or another claiming
him as a dependent), then his parent my claim him as a tax exemption on her federal income
taxes.
173. Russ v. Watts, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1099 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
174. Id. at 1096. The decision never mentions the age of Robert Russ, though it is clear from
the court's application of Bell that Russ is an adult: "the only appreciable difference between
Russ and the decedent in Bell is that six months prior to his death, Russ impregnated a woman."
Id. at 1099.
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by a Chicago police officer during a traffic stop. 175 The defendants
moved for summary judgment on the basis that Vera Love and Isaac
Russ did not have standing to bring this suit because they had failed
to allege a constitutional violation. 176 In so doing, the defendants
asked the district court to overturn the Seventh Circuit's holding
made 18 years earlier in Bell. 177 Citing the binding effect of Bell in the
Seventh Circuit, the district court noted that "to answer the question
of standing in the instant case, the court must determine whether
Russ had become part of another family unit."'178 Russ was a college
student, unmarried, and lived at home when not attending college. 17 9
The defendants asserted that Robert Russ was no longer part of his
80
parents' family unit, as he had conceived a child before his death.
The district court held that Robert Russ was still part of his parents'
family unit.1 8 The court noted that the only "appreciable difference
between Russ and the decedent in Bell is that six months prior to his
death, Russ impregnated a woman."'1 2 Robert Russ and the mother of
83
his child had not formed their own family unit.1
2. The Ninth Circuit's Approach: The Constitutional Right to
Companionship Exists Outside the Right to Rear One's Child
Two years after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bell, the
Ninth Circuit held in Standberg v. Helena that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the interest of a
parent in the companionship of her adult child.' 8 4 On June 7, 1981,
Edward Standberg was arrested for driving a motorcycle without a
license. 85 He was taken to a police station and placed in a jail cell.18 6
Thirty minutes following his detainment, Edward Standberg was
found dead, hanging from the jail cell ceiling. 8 7 His parents filed an
action against the City of Helena, the Chief of Police, the police

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1098.
See id. (recounting defendants' argument that courts have held contrary to Bell).
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1098-99.
Id. at 1099.
Id.
Id.
Standberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 746.
Id.
Id.

2004]

RIGHTS OF PARENTS OFADULT CHILDREN

1909

dispatchers, and all officers on duty that evening. 8 8 The Standbergs
alleged that the death of their 22-year-old son deprived them of two
rights protected by the constitutionl.189 First, they alleged that the
action of the defendants deprived them of their right to rear Edward
Standberg. 190 The Standbergs premised this right as implicitly
protected by the Ninth1 9 1 and Tenth 92 Amendments. 193 Ruth and
Howard Standberg also alleged that the death of their son deprived
them of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to the society and
companionship of their son.194
The Ninth Circuit held that the parents' interest in directing
the upbringing of their son was not implicated because Edward
Standberg was twenty-two years old at the time of his death and no
longer a minor; therefore, Ruth and Howard Standberg "had not been
deprived of any constitutional right to parent."'195 Nevertheless, the
parents were still free to claim "a violation of their fourteenth
amendment due process rights in the companionship and society of
188. Id.
189. Id. at 746, 748.
190. Id. at 746.
191. The Ninth Amendment of the Constitution provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Some believe that the Ninth Amendment serves as a source of
substantive rights, much like the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-41 (1980); CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW: THE 1979 HOLMES LECTURES 43-50 (1981). The Ninth
Amendment had been mentioned infrequently in Supreme Court decisions until it became the
subject of analysis by several Justices in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice
Douglas, writing for the court, cited to the text of the Ninth Amendment to support the
contention that the right to privacy (which included the right of married couples to use
contraception) could be found in the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments, and the right was protected by one or a complex of Amendments, despite the
absence of a specific reference in the text of the Constitution. Id. at 484-85. Justice Goldberg,
concurring, devoted several pages to the Amendment: "[T]he Ninth Amendment shows a belief of
the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in
the first eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed
exhaustive." Id. at 492. For a collection of articles on the Ninth Amendment, see THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E.
Barnett, ed., 1989).
192. The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution provides: 'The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Some commentators believe that the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments work in tandem. See Norman Redlich, Are There "Certain
Rights ... Retained by the People'?,37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 806, 808-810 (1962). Norman Redlich
argues: "The Ninth and Tenth Amendments... provide a formula for protecting the individual
against both the federal and state governments in the enjoyment of these [fundamental,
unenumerated] rights" through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 808-09.
193. Standberg, 791 F.2d at 748-49,
194. Id. at 748.
195. Id. at 748 n.1.
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the decedent without asserting such rights in conjunction with the
196
ninth and tenth amendment."
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, held that the parental right to the
companionship of an adult child exists independently of the right to
rear one's child. Such a conclusion is reinforced by the court's
subsequent decision in Smith v. City of Fontana.197 In Smith, the
adult and minor children of the decedent sued the City of Fontana and
various police officers, under section 1983, for the deprivation of their
198
constitutionally protected right to the companionship of their father.
Two officers, responding to a call concerning a domestic quarrel,
approached Rufus Smith in his parking lot, struck him in the groin
and face, and ultimately shot him in his back. 199
Facing these facts, the court observed that a parent of a minor
child is allowed to recover under section 1983 when state interference
"threatened not only the parents' interest in the companionship of
their children, but also the parents' constitutionally protected interest
in raising their children." 20 0 When a child claims constitutional
protection for her relationship with a parent, however, it is not
premised on the right to care, custody, and control, but only on a
companionship interest. 20 ' The Ninth Circuit thus found the familial
companionship interest to be constitutionally protected in Smith. It
relied predominantly on its previous decision in Standberg,concluding
that a parent of an adult child still maintains a companionship
interest in her child, even though she no longer maintains her right to
20 2
rear the child.
The Standberg holding rests on a notion fundamentally
different from the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bell. To the Standberg
court, it is the virtue of a family relationship, and not the parent's
interest in rearing her child, that gives rise to the substantive due
process violation. 20 3 Because of the manner in which the Ninth Circuit
premised its decision, it logically follows that it is irrelevant whether
or not the child has entered another family unit or remains part of his
parents' family. In the Seventh Circuit's view, such an inquiry is

196. Id. at 748.
197. 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987).
198. Id. at 1417-18.
199. Id. at 1414.
200. Id. at 1418. Two previous Ninth Circuit decisions permitted a parent to recover under
section 1983 for the deprivation of their right to rear their children. Kelson v. City of Springfield,
767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).
201. Smith, 818 F.2d at 1419.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1419.
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needed to ascertain whether a parent still had an interest in "the
20 4
companionship, care, custody, and management" of her child.
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, however, the scope of the Ninth Circuit's
holding does not automatically foreclose a suit brought by the parent
of an adult child who has married and/or has children of his own.
B. Rejecting the Interest: The First,D.C., and Third CircuitsHold
that the Due Process Clause Does Not Protect a Parent'sInterest in the
Companionship of Her Adult Child
The First, D.C., and Third Circuits have rejected the contention
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
parent's interest in the companionship of her adult child. All three
circuits agree that the threshold inquiry as to whether a
constitutionally protected liberty interest exists must be answered in
the negative. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, these Circuits interpret the
parental liberty interest defined by the Supreme Court to apply only
to minor children. They reject the Ninth Circuit's formation of a
companionship interest outside the childrearing context. The First
and Third Circuits additionally assert that there can be no
substantive due process violation when the conduct is not aimed at a
parent's relationship with her adult child.
1. The First Circuit's Approach: Precedent and Public Policy Guide
Against Expanding Substantive Due Process
In Ortiz v. Burgos, the First Circuit refused to recognize a
parental liberty interest in the companionship of an adult child. 20 5 In
that case, Jose Ortiz was fatally beaten by guards while an inmate of
the Guayama Regional Detention Center in Puerto Rico. 206 Jose's
mother sued under section 1983 for the deprivation of her
companionship interests with her son. The decedent's stepfather and
siblings proffered a similar claim, alleging that the defendants denied
them of their constitutional right to the companionship of their
stepson and brother, respectively. 20 7 The district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the stepfather and
siblings, but it permitted the mother's claims to go forward. 20 8 The

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1246 (7th Cir. 1984).
807 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986).
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
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mother ultimately recovered $20,000 on her personal claim. 20 9 The
210
stepfather and siblings appealed the dismissal of their claims.
Though the First Circuit only assessed the claims brought by the
stepfather and siblings, it explicitly stated that the claim brought by
211
the mother similarly would have failed.
The First Circuit first looked to Supreme Court precedent in
determining that the liberty interest the stepfather and sibilings'
asserted in this case could not be established. 212 The court defined the
Supreme Court precedent as falling within two categories. First, as a
matter of substantive due process, the Court has protected only
certain, particularly private, family decisions from governmental
interference. Citing Griswold, Pierce, and Moore, the court argued that
these "cases do not stand for the proposition that family relationships
are, in the abstract, protected against all state encroachments, direct
or indirect. ' 213 The precedent focused on choice, suggesting that the
constitutional right is one of preemption and that family members
have the right, when confronted with the state's attempt to make
choices for them, to choose for themselves. 214
The court then
summarily concluded that the right the plaintiffs asserted "d[id] not
involve such a choice." 215 Moreover, in past cases involving parental
rights, the Supreme Court had been "concerned with preventing
governmental interference with the rearing of young children." 216 The
Ortiz court recognized that a parent's constitutional interest lies in
both controlling the child's upbringing and in retaining the custody
and companionship of the child. 217
However, the plaintiffs
relationship with her child was not accorded this constitutional
protection since Jose Ortiz was older than twenty-one years of age at
2 18
his death and thus was not a minor.
The First Circuit next looked to Supreme Court precedent
indicating that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated
only when the state seeks to change or affect the relationship of
219
parent and child in furtherance of some legitimate state interest.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 7, n.1.
212. Id. at 7-8.
213. Id. at 8.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. Id. (citing Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 453 U.S. 18, 38-39 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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The court explained: "[W]e think it significant that the Supreme Court
has protected the parent only when the government directly acts to
sever or otherwise affect his or her legal relationship with a child."220
Here, the court characterized the parental relationship as "only
incidentally" affected. 22 1
The court refused to characterize
government action that incidentally affects the parent-child
relationship as giving rise to a constitutional violation, though it did
recognize that other courts had taken such a step. 222
The First Circuit also believed that logic and equity warned
against "erect[ing] a new substantive right upon the rare and
relatively uncharted terrain of substantive due process." 223 The court
suggested that recognition of such a liberty interest would
constitutionalize adjudication in a myriad of situations the court
considered inappropriate for due process scrutiny. 22 4 Under such a
regime, for example, parents potentially would have an action for a
child's alleged wrongful incarceration or wrongful discharge from a
state job that forced her to seek employment in another part of the
country. Defining and limiting liberty interests in such an area would
be not only exceedingly difficult but also duplicative of state tort
actions for wrongful death. 22 5
2. The D.C. Circuit's Approach: The Parental Liberty Interest is
Protected Only for Parents of Minor Children
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, in Butera v.
District of Columbia, declined to recognize a parental liberty interest
in the companionship of an adult child. 226 The court held like the First
Circuit in Ortiz, that such an interest is not protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Butera, the
decedent, Eric Butera, telephoned the D.C. Police Department to
provide information about a highly publicized triple homicide that had
occurred some months earlier at a Starbucks coffee shop. 227 He
informed Detective Anthony Patterson that, while purchasing or using
crack cocaine, he twice had overheard someone talking about the

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 641.
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Starbucks murders. 228 Lieutenant Brian McAllister and Sergeant
Nicholas Breul were assigned to the Starbucks investigation and
decided to stage an undercover drug purchase at the house where
Butera had overheard the conversation. 229
Butera, who was thirty-one years old, agreed to assist the
officers with the undercover operation, and the officers planned the
operation to resemble Butera's previous visits to the house as closely
as possible. 23 0 Butera was to meet the officers no more than fifteen
minutes after he was dropped off at the house. 231 The officers assured
Butera that they would watch him carefully and ensure that he would
not be harmed. 232 Once Butera approached the house, however, the
officers parked their vehicles in such a manner that they were unable
to see Butera when he attempted to enter. 23 3
Thirty minutes after Butera was dropped off, uniformed
officers unconnected with the investigation appeared in response to a
civilian call reporting an unconscious person in the rear walkway of
the house. 234 Ten minutes after seeing those uniformed officers arrive,
the officers with whom Butera had worked heard a dispatcher report
that a man was down in the alley behind the house Butera had
attempted to enter. 235 Butera had never gained entry to the house;
rather he was robbed and stomped to death in the alley. 236
Eric Butera's mother sued the District of Columbia and the
police officers who engineered the undercover operation, both on her
own behalf and on behalf of her son's estate, alleging that they
recklessly failed to provide adequate protection for her son. 237 In the
district court, the jury returned verdicts against the defendants and
awarded Terry Butera $70,530,000 in compensatory damages and
$27,570,000 in punitive damages. 238 Of this award, $34,000,000 was
awarded for Terry Butera's section 1983 action premised on the
deprivation of her parental liberty interest of the companionship of
239
her adult son.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 641-42.
at 642.

at 643.

at 640.
at 641.
at 644 n.4.
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In overturning the district court's verdict, the D.C. Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court has not addressed directly whether a
parent possesses a constitutionally protected interest in the
companionship of an adult child. 240 Nonetheless, the precedent in the
241
D.C. Circuit and other circuits suggested that no such right exists.
The plaintiff relied primarily on the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Franz v.
24 3
United States,242 as well as the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bell.
The court believed that Franz, as well as the Supreme Court cases
Franz cited, focused on "securing the rights of parents to have custody
of and to raise their minor children in a manner that develops
'parental and filial bonds free from government interference."'' 244 In
looking at Franz and the Supreme Court precedent, the court found
"nothing in Supreme Court case law to indicate an intention to extend
these concerns in support of a constitutional liberty interest in a
2 45
parent's relationship with her adult son."
Futhermore, the D.C. Circuit explicitly rejected the Seventh
Circuit's contention in Bell that the same precedent cautioned against
drawing lines based solely on the age of the child. 24 6 The court
believed that different constitutional treatment is warranted when the
parent-child relationship involves two adults because, as a child grows
older, his dependence on his parents "for guidance, socialization, and
support gradually diminishes."24 7
Similarly, the strength and
importance the emotional bond between the child and his parents
usually decreases. 248 Because the differences in a child's relationship
with his parents during childhood and adulthood is "sufficiently
marked to warrant sharp constitutional treatment," the court held

240. Id. at 654.
241. Id.
242. In Franz v. United States, federal officials relocated and changed the identities of a
divorced mother and her minor children pursuant to the Federal Witness Protection Program,
with "the effect of severing the ongoing relationship between the children and their natural
father." 707 F.2d 582, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The children's father sued the United States on
statutory and constitutional grounds, alleging a violation of his constitutionally protected right
to his children's companionship. Id. In holding that such a right existed, the Franz court
acknowledged "the profound importance of the bond between a parent and a child to the
emotional life of both." Id. at 599. The court expressed "skepticism" at governmental
interference with a parent's right to "shape the development" of his children and to be intimately
involved in the "rearing of his offspring." Id. at 597-99.
243. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1243-44 (7th Cir.1984). For an indepth
discussion of Bell, see supraPart III.A.1.
244. Butera, 235 F.3d at 655 (emphasis in original).
245. Id. at 655.
246. Id. at 655-56.
247. Id. at 656.
248. Id.
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that "a parent does not have a constitutionally-protected liberty
interest in the companionship of a child who is past minority and
249
independent.,
3. The Third Circuit's Approach: Clearing Up the Ambiguity
The Third Circuit's decision in McCurdy v. Dodd resolved the
ambiguity within the circuit regarding whether a parent's relationship
with her adult child is constitutionally protected. 250 During the fifteen
years prior to McCurdy, many district courts within the Third Circuit
had adopted the Seventh Circuit's view of the parental liberty interest
and allowed parents of adults to assert independent substantive due
process claims when government conduct injured their adult
children. 251 Because the Third Circuit had cited the Bell opinion in a
footnote in Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 252 district courts
mistakenly believed that the Bell holding had become law in the
circuit. 253 In Estate of Bailey, the Third Circuit noted: "We follow the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Bell v. City of Milwaukee ... in holding
based on these precedents that a parent whose child has died as a
result of unlawful state action may maintain an action under section
1983 for the deprivation of liberty." 254 However, in McCurdy the Third
Circuit rejected the parental liberty interest described in Bell, holding
instead that a parent's interest in the companionship of her adult
255
child is not a fundamental liberty interest.
256
McCurdy centered on the shooting death of Donta Dawson.
On the night of October 1, 1998, two Philadelphia police officers, Kirk
Dodd and Christopher DiPasquele, spotted Donta Dawson sitting
alone in a parked car and pulled up alongside the vehicle. 257 The
officers asked Dawson what he was doing and whether he needed
assistance. 258 Dawson looked away from the officers and said

249. Id.
250. McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 828-30 (3d. Cir. 2003).
251. See e.g., Pahle v. Colebrookdale Township, 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
White v. City of Philadelphia, 118 F. Supp. 2d 564, 567 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Estate of Cooper v.
Learner, 705 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Agresta v. Sambor, 687 F. Supp. 162, 164
(E.D. Pa. 1988).
252. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
253. See cases cited supra note 251.
254. Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 509 n.7 (internal citation omitted).
255. McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 828-30.
256. Id. at 821.
257. Id. at 822.
258. Id.
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nothing. 259 Thereafter, Officer Dodd approached the driver's side
window of Dawson's car, again inquiring if Dawson needed
assistance. 260 This time, Dawson looked at Dodd, shrugged his
26 1
shoulders, and turned away but did not respond verbally.
Both officers then started screaming at Dawson, demanding
that he raise his hands, and punctuated their demands by using
obscenities. 262 After Dawson did not respond, DiPasquale drew his
weapon. 263 Dodd reached into the driver's side window of Dawson's car
and removed the key from the ignition. 264 Dodd quickly backed away
from the window and informed DiPasquale of his belief that Dawson
265
had a gun.
The officers continued screaming at Dawson to raise his
hands. 266 When Dawson finally began to move his left arm, Officer
DiPasquale fired at Dawson, fatally injuring him. 267 A subsequent
investigation revealed that Dawson had no gun. 268 Bobby McCurdy,
the father of the decedent, sought recovery for a violation of his
constitutional right to the companionship of his 19-year-old son,
pursuant to section 1983.270
The Third Circuit held that a companionship interest between
a parent and her adult child was not constitutionally protected. First,
the court construed Supreme Court precedent on the parental liberty
interest as protecting the right of parents to make critical childrearing
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of minors.2 7 1 While
the court acknowledged that the Stanley Court included
"companionship" of a child within that right, it denied that such a
definition changed the substantive due process framework, which
limited the parental liberty interest to decision-making regarding the
care, custody, and control of minor children. 272 By framing the right in
this manner, the McCurdy court held that the parental liberty interest
naturally terminates "at the point at which a child begins to assume
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
270.
271.
272.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 829 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)).
Id. at 827 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972)).
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that critical decision-making responsibility for himself or herself."273
The Third Circuit attempted to define the contours of the parental
liberty interest and concluded that the interest generally will cease at
the point at which the child legally becomes an adult.274 In certain
circumstances, however, the legal age of adulthood might not be the
point at which the child is "emancipated." 275 The court suggested that
even if the child is older than eighteen, a parent may still possess her
276
parental liberty interest in that child if she is not yet emancipated.
Like the Ortiz court, the Third Circuit was hesitant to extend
Due Process to situations in which the action at issue was not
deliberately directed at the parent-child relationship. The court found
support for this interpretation in the Supreme Court's statement in
Daniels that the due process guarantee historically has been applied
only to "deliberatedecisions of government officials to deprive a person
of life, liberty, or property."277 The Third Circuit cited the Ortiz
decision for further support. 278 Though Officer DiPasquale's action
279
may have been deliberate, it was directed solely at Donta Dawson.
He considered neither Cynthia Dawson nor Bobby McCurdy when he
280
fired the fatal shot.
IV. RESOLVING THE SPLIT: A Two-TIERED APPROACH TO THE PARENTAL
LIBERTY INTEREST

This Section attempts to resolve the threshold constitutional
question that has divided the circuits: whether a parent has a
protected liberty interest in the companionship of an adult child. This
Section argues that the Court should resolve the issue by defining and
extending the scope of the parental liberty interest established in its
precedent dealing with childrearing, 28 1 the rights of the natural
father, 28 2 and the definition of the family unit. 2 3 The parental liberty
interest should vary in scope based on the two stages of a child's life.
The interest would be at its full extent during a child's minor years,
and it would necessarily contract once the child becomes an adult.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 829.
Id.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 830-31.
Id. at 827 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)) (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 829-30.
Id.
See supra Part I1B..1.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.3
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Such a two-tiered approach to the parental liberty interest reflects the
changing reality of the parent-child relationship as the child matures
into adulthood. It also reflects the necessary constitutional balance
between the parental liberty interest and the individual liberty and
autonomy interests of the child.
Part A of this Section discusses the scope of the parental liberty
interest. It first defines the parental liberty interest, arguing that
companionship is an included right. Part A concludes by discussing
the scope of the parental liberty interest as redefined by a two-tiered
approach. Part B looks to the legal tradition concerning a parent's
relationship with her adult child. It first examines the Supreme Court
precedent on familial autonomy and argues that the established
familial rights would mean little if the state were constitutionally
permitted to act to destroy the parent-child relationship once a child
reaches maturity. Part B also provides a cursory review of the legal
tradition of according special rights to and imposing obligations on
parents and adult children because of their special relationship.
Finally, Part C explores the practical application of the two-tiered
approach it proposes and addresses potential criticisms that may
arise.
A. Defining the Scope of the ParentalLiberty Interest
1. Defining the Constellation of Rights
The Supreme Court has attempted to define the scope of the
parental liberty interest on several occasions. Generally, the interest
is defined in terms of a constellation of rights. However, the Court has
not consistently included the same rights each time it has defined the
interest. In particular, the Court's inclusion of companionship as a
component of the parental liberty interest has varied. The Stanley
Court defined the right as "the interest of a parent in the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children. '28 4 In Troxel, by contrast, the Court defined the constellation
more narrowly: "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children." 28 5 This treatment has led some commentators to suggest
that the parental liberty interest, even in regard to a minor child, does
not include a right to companionship.
284. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
285. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion).

1920

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:5:1883

The problem of the varying definitions of the parental liberty
interest is compounded by the fact that Supreme Court precedent
tends to focus on the right of parents to make decisions regarding
their children's upbringing. 2 6 These cases arise where the state seeks
to make decisions about issues such as a child's education, instead of
leaving those decisions to the parent's discretion. 28 7 Because of this
focus, lower courts have interpreted the interest as extending no
further than "the right of parents to make critical child-rearing
28 8
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of minors."
Yet to exclude companionship from the constellation of rights
belies Supreme Court precedent that has expressly included
companionship as a component of the parental liberty interest. The
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that companionship is a separate and
distinct aspect of the parental liberty interest. As noted above, for
example, the Stanley Court included companionship among the
constellation of the parental liberty interest, 2 9 and that definition of
the interest has been cited repeatedly in the Court's subsequent cases
considering the Constitution and the family. 290 Furthermore, even
while dissenting in Troxel, Justice Stevens explained: "My colleagues
are of course correct to recognize that the right of a parent to maintain
a relationship with his or her child is among the interests included
most often in the constellation of liberties protected through the
291
Fourteenth Amendment."
The difficulty in deciphering the precise scope of the Court's
decisions on the parental liberty interest also stems from the fact that
it is impossible, in the context of a minor child, to separate the
companionship interest from the other parental liberty interests. It is
likely for this reason that the Court has spent little time delineating
whether companionship is included in the constellation of the parental
liberty interest.
Some argue that the right of companionship only exists to the
extent of a parent's ability to direct the upbringing of her child. 292 As

286. For a discussion on the Supreme Court's precedent on the parental rights to
childrearing, see supra Part II. B. 1.
287. See Pierce v. Society Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
288. McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 829 (3d. Cir. 2003).
289. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651. (1972).
290. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (plurality opinion); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978).
291. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
292. For cases holding that a plaintiff has not been deprived of the right to companionship
with her minor child when a state actor kills her child, see, for example, White v. Talboys, 573 F.
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such, a parent would be unable to exercise her liberty interest if the
state acted to deprive her of the companionship of her child. Thus, one
might argue that the parental interest in companionship is really no
more than the liberty to exercise liberty. However, such a
characterization of the interest degrades the normative value of
familial companionship. To reduce the right to companionship to the
liberty to exercise liberty fails to recognize the family unit as a source
of emotional support, love, and nurture. It defines the parent-child
relationship in perfunctory and utilitarian terms.
Indeed, the Court's decisions in Stanley, Quilloin, and Lehr
illustrate that the Court considers the right of companionship to exist
alongside, not subordinate to, a parent's interest in the control,
custody, and care of her child. 293 In these cases, the fathers were not
merely contesting a state regulation which interfered with their right
to make decisions regarding their children's schooling or religion, as in
Meyer and Pierce.294 Instead, they were contesting state regulations
which completely divested them of their right to parent. 295 In these
cases, therefore, the Court had the opportunity to consider more
thoroughly the entire scope of the parental liberty interest, rather
than make ad hoc determinations about the constitutionality of
specific state regulations. 296 Accordingly, in Stanley, the Court first
included companionship among the collection of parental rights. Over
a decade later, the Lehr Court reaffirmed that when a father forges a
relationship with his child, "his interest in personal contact with his
297
child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause."
2. Defining the Scope of the Parental Liberty Interest
The constellation of rights included in the parental liberty
interest-companionship, care, custody, and management-should be
seen as varying at the two stages of a child's life. In the first stage, the
parent possesses the full constellation of the parental liberty interest.
This stage exists until the point where the child reaches adulthood in
the constitutional sense, which may not be the same as the
statutorily-defined age of maturity. In the second stage, the parent
Supp. 49, 51 (D. Colo. 1983); Jackson v. Marsh, 551 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (D. Colo. 1982); Ealey v.
City of Detroit, 375 N.W.2d 435, 442 (Mich. 1985).
293. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
294. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
295. See cases cited supra note 287.
296. For a discussion of cases in which the court made ad hoc determinations of the
constitutionality of a specific state regulation, see supra Part II.B.1.
297. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
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still possesses a liberty interest in the adult child, though the scope of
that interest is necessarily more limited than during the first stage. If
parents retained the full constellation of the parental liberty interest
into a child's adulthood, that interest would directly conflict with the
adult child's own constitutional liberty and autonomy. Therefore, only
those rights included in the parental liberty interest that have status
independent of their role in guarding a child's individual liberties
should remain after the child matures into adulthood.
Until a child reaches adulthood in the constitutional sense, a
parent should possess the full bundle of the parental liberty interest.
Children, though they possess constitutional rights, are accorded
lesser constitutional protection for their individual rights. 298 Indeed,
the Court has recognized that the "the constitutional rights of children
cannot be equated with those of adults."299 This limitation exists for
three reasons: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in childrearing. 30 0
In her role
managing and maintaining custody over her child, the parent should
be viewed as the steward or bearer of her child's constitutionally
protected liberties.
It is at the point when the individual reaches adulthood in the
constitutional sense that the first tier of the parental liberty interest
yields to the narrower second tier. While theoretically simple, the
practical determination of when a child fully attains her individual
rights, and thus becomes an adult in the constitutional sense, is
difficult. The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the
precise point at which one possesses the full gamut of constitutional
rights. The Court has made clear, however, that the decision should

298. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (recognizing "three reasons justifying the
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing"); Planned Parenthood
of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."). Judicial decisions
involving children are especially difficult to interpret and, as a group, fail to reflect a coherent
understanding of the essential issues at stake. While as a general proposition, children do
possess lesser constitutional protections than adults, at times the Court has relied on the
centrality of autonomy to contemporary notions of personhood and has protected children's rights
just as it protects the rights of adults in comparable situations. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-14 (1969) (recognizing First Amendment rights of high
school students); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (extending constitutional protection to
children in delinquency proceedings).
299. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
300. Id. at 634-639.
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not be made in terms of an arbitrary age: "Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically when one attains the statedefined age of majority." 30 1 Certainly, the three articulated reasons
why children are accorded lesser protection of their individual rights
provide the starting point in assessing the age of constitutional
majority. Therefore, a child may be deemed an adult in the
constitutional sense when she becomes less vulnerable, when she can
make critical decisions for herself, and when her parent relinquishes
the role of childrearing. 3 2 The inquiry is akin to state determinations
of emancipation, and like those proceedings, there may be a rebuttable
presumption that an individual is an adult in the constitutional sense
30 3
at the statutorily-defined age of majority.
The scope of the parental liberty is determined solely by
whether a child has reached adulthood in the constitutional sense.
Even though a child may reach the state-defined age of majority, the
full constellation of the parental liberty interest may remain intact if
the child remains peculiarly vulnerable and/or unable to make
informed, mature decisions. A clear example would be the case of a
mentally retarded child. Though the child may be older than eighteen
years of age, her parents would still retain the full scope of their
parental liberty interest if they so desired. In such a case, the parental
liberty interest in companionship would extend to a child who is
3 04
statutorily defined as an adult.
The more difficult question, however, is assessing whether the
parental liberty interest exists past the point where the child
possesses the full gamut of his constitutional liberties, and if it does,
what the scope of that interest should be. Some of the rights typically
included within the parental liberty interest would be at odds with the
constitutional notion of individual liberty and autonomy. 30 5 The
301. Danforth,428 U.S. at 74.
302. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Kathleen L.H. v. Wayne E.H., 523 A.2d 977, 978 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987);
Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1037-38 (N.J. 1982); Geiger v. Rouse, 715 A.2d 454, 458 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998).
303. Courts may view a child as capable of making these decisions for herself at an age
earlier than the statutorily-defined age of majority. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (A pregnant
minor is entitled to an abortion if a court finds either: "(1) she is mature enough and well enough
informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her
parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the
desired abortion would be in her best interests.").
304. It should be mentioned that the duration of the parental liberty interest in the first tier
is very similar to the Third Circuit's definition of the interest in McCurdy. See supra Part IV.B.3.
305. For instance, the parent of an adult would not have veto power over her child's ability to
obtain an abortion. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622; City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Ohio
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parental liberty interest in the custody, management, and control of a
child would directly and substantially conflict with the adult child's
individual liberties. Conflicting aspects of the parental interests must
clearly give way to the child once he reaches adulthood in the
constitutional sense. However, certain rights within the constellation
of the parental liberty interest would not be at odds with the adult
child's constitutional rights. The parent's interest in the
companionship and care 30 6 of his adult child does not conflict with the
child's constitutional liberties, and therefore, the scope of the parental
liberty interest in an adult child should entail these rights. Indeed,
many of the other constitutional rights regarding family life would
make little sense if the parent was accorded no constitutional
protection for the relationship with her adult child. 30 7 Moreover, this
nation has expressed a profound respect for the parent-child
relationship, and that tradition does not cease once the child reaches
adulthood. Therefore, the parent maintains an interest in the
companionship of her adult child.
The existence of the parental liberty interest in the narrower
second stage should be interpreted much like the parental liberty
interest in the first stage. A parent's interest in a relationship with
her adult child does not exist by virtue of blood relation. 30 8 In Lehr,
the Court explained, "When an unwed father demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward
to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal
contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due
process clause." 30 9 Therefore, it follows that a parent's constitutional
interest in the companionship of her adult child should be granted
constitutional protection only if the parent continues to foster a
relationship with that child. In the rare event that a parent's interest
in the companionship and care of her adult child would conflict with

v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Also, the parental
right to hospitalize a child, even against the child's wishes, would quite clearly conflict with an
adult's right to refuse medical treatment. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1979);
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-82 (1990).
306. In this respect, the right to "care" encompasses the ability to provide needed assistance
to, to be concerned or to be interested in an adult child. It should not be equated with providing
watchful oversight, charge, or supervision, which would be included in the first tier of the liberty
interest.
307. See infra Part V.B.1.
308. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 253-56 (1978) (upholding a statute that prevented
an unwed father from blocking the adoption of his child).
309. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
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the child's constitutional right, the parental liberty interest would
necessarily yield.
B. Looking to Tradition
1. Reading the Precedent
It would be ironic, on the one hand, to recognize the
constitutional right to procreate, 310 to supervise the upbringing of
children, 311 to retain custody of one's illegitimate children, 3 12 and to
31 3
live in the same residence with one's family members of choosing,
but on the other hand to deny parents constitutional protection for
their interest in the companionship of their adult child. These
fundamental liberties mean nothing if the state can act to destroy the
right to enjoy the family bond. To protect families from lesser
intrusions into family life, yet allow the state to destroy the family
relationship altogether, would drastically distort the concept of
31 4
ordered liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
That the Due Process Clause protects a parent's liberty interest
in the companionship of her adult child is supported by Supreme
Court cases protecting one's choice in reproduction. State action that
impedes on a parent's companionship with an adult child interferes
with the fruition and fulfillment of the fundamental right to procreate.
To the extent one views reproduction as an important human choice, it
should recognize the individual's desire to extend her bloodline beyond
her own life, stretching into her child's adult years.
Indeed, it is something more than the mere privacy of the act
that prompted the Court to protect procreation. Certainly, Justice
Douglas questioned the enforceability of a Connecticut law that
prohibited married couples from using contraception by considering
the privacy that surrounded the possibility of government intrusion

310. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
311. See supraPart II.B.1.
312. See supra Part II.B.2.
313. See supra Part II.B.3.
314. See Myres v. Rask, 602 F. Supp. 210, 213 (D. Colo. 1985) ("It would be ironic indeed to
recognize, on the one hand, the constitutional rights to marry, to procreate, to supervise the
upbringing of children, to retain custody of one's illegitimate children, and to live in the same
residence with one's 'family,' but on the other hand, to deny parents constitutional protection for
the continued life of their child.") (citations omitted).
316. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the right of a
married person is protected by the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.)
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into the bedroom. 31 6
However, if Griswold v. Connecticut and
Eisenstadt v. Baird317 were driven merely by the intimacy of sexual
conduct, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas318 would have had grounds to
hold that all sex between consenting adults is a fundamental right.
However, the Lawrence Court instead overturned the Texas law
prohibiting homosexual sodomy on mere rational basis review-the
standard of review the court deploys for all rights not deemed to be
19
fundamental.
Instead, the focus of Griswold and Eisenstadtis the right "to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."3 21 It is the privacy of determining whether to have a
child, not the privacy of the sexual act that may produce the child,
that was afforded constitutional protection in Griswold and
Eisenstadt.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court struck down an Oklahoma
statute that provided for compulsory sterilization of persons convicted
three times of felonies showing "moral turptitude" but did not apply to
such white collar crimes as embezzlement. 322 The Court objected to
the distinction between crimes involving moral turptitude and white
collar crimes, 323 but it emphasized that its reasons for applying strict
scrutiny was that the statute involved "one of the basic civil rights of
man." 324 The Court observed that "[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 32 5 It was
because the state preempted one's choice of whether or not to
procreate-not his ability to engage in sexual relations-that the court
considered probative in Skinner.
It was thirty-five years later, in Roe v. Wade, that the court
again considered the decisional aspect of whether to bear or beget a
child. 326 In this case, the Court also took notice of the lifelong impact
of having a child. Justice Stewart noted that the interests of a woman
in deciding whether or not to carry a fetus to term involves the "giving
317. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
318. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
319. See id. at 568.
321. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
322. 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
323. Id. at 538-39.
324. Id. at 541.
325. Id.
326. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973).
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of her physical and emotional self during pregnancy and the interests
that will be affected throughout her life by the birth and raising of a
327
child."
The Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland also provides significant support for establishing a parental
liberty interest in the companionship of an adult child. 328 In Moore,
the Court expressed willingness to protect family relations from
unnecessary state infringement outside the confines of the traditional
nuclear family.3 29 On a broad level, the Moore decision supports that
the Due Process Clause may extend to the liberty interest at issue, or
at the very least, that the Court does not see the Due Process Clause
as protecting only family relations involving parents and minor
children.
Indeed, when one begins to look at the contours of the Court's
decision in Moore, the case provides even greater support for holding
that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship
of her adult child. 3 30 Though the Court defined the liberty interest in
Moore as the freedom to structure a household with various relatives,
the claimed interest was, in essence, the freedom to associate and
develop intimate relations with one's family members. 33 1 So phrased,
the Moore decision honors the family as a unit that provides emotional
support and opportunities for intimacy and self-expression. It also
suggests that such a familial bond is not exclusive to a parent and her
333
minor child. 33 2 Cohabitation enhances the companionship interest.
The Moore Court, however, chose to base the tradition on
economic necessity, the intergenerational transmission of family
values, and the prevalence of extended family households among
racial and ethnic minorities. 33 4 Yet greater attention to familial bond
and companionship would have made the decision more defensible and
easily distinguishable from Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.335 As
noted earlier, the Belle Terre decision upheld a zoning ordinance that
forbade groups of three or more unrelated persons from sharing a
327. Id. at 113 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
328. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
329. For a more thorough discussion of Moore, see supraPart II.B.3.
330. Ira Lupu makes a very similar argument with respect to Moore v. City of East
Cleveland. Lupu, supra note 23, at 1051-54. He argues that Moore makes more sense from the
viewpoint of protecting human intimacy. Id. The argument in this Part of the Note borrows
heavily from Lupu.
331. See id. at 1051.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. Id.
335. See id.
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single-family residence. 336 While the unrelated individuals seeking to
cohabitate in Belle Terre may have been seeking companionship, it is
the intimacy of the familial bond and the profound legal tradition for
the family that readily distinguishes the two cases. 337
2. The Family in the Law
Like the Supreme Court's decisions on familial autonomy,
legislatures and common law concepts of the family have recognized
the importance of a parent's relationship with her adult child and the
role of that relationship in broader society. Even a cursory review of
this tradition reflects the special rights and responsibilities created by
virtue of the parent-child relationship. Congress, for instance, has
recognized this reality in the Internal Revenue Code. 338 An individual
is eligible for an exemption in the computation of her taxable income
for the care and support of a dependent, even if that dependent resides
in a separate household. 339 Included in the definition of a dependent
is an adult child's care of his or her parents, and a parent's support of
340
an adult child who is a student and under twenty-four years of age.

336. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
337. Lupu, supra note 23, at 1051-52.
338. The tax code provides that "the term 'dependent' means any of the following individuals
over half of whose support, for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer
begins, was received from the taxpayer (or is treated under subsection (c) or (e) as received from
the taxpayer):
(1) A son or daughter of the taxpayer, or a descendant of either,
(2) A stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer,
(3) A brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer,
(4) The father or mother of the taxpayer, or an ancestor of either,
(5) A stepfather or stepmother of the taxpayer,
(6) A son or daughter of a brother or sister of the taxpayer,
(7) A brother or sister of the father or mother of the taxpayer,
(8) A son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in- law, or
sister-in-law of the taxpayer, or
(9) An individual (other than an individual who at any time during the taxable year
was the spouse, determined without regard to section 7703, of the taxpayer) who, for
the taxable year of the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode the home of the
taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household." 26 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2004)
(emphasis added).
339. Id.
340. The tax code defines students as "an individual who during each of 5 calendar months
during the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins(A) is a full-time student at an educational organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A)(ii); or
(B) is pursuing a full-time course of institutional on-farm training under the
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State laws of descent and distribution reflect this same
understanding. If a decedent dies intestate and without a surviving
3 41
spouse, her entire estate passes to her children, minor or adult.
Moreover, if the decedent dies without a surviving spouse or children,
the estate then passes to any surviving parent, or both parents equally
if both are surviving. 42 Also, many states have enacted "relative
responsibility" laws which impose legal obligations of support on
certain individuals. Nearly half of the states impose obligations on
children to support their indigent parents, providing a reciprocal duty
3 43
to the earlier obligation of parents to support their minor children.
These laws find their antecedents in a 1601 English statute which
344
created the duty of the child to provide support for his parents.
C. Addressing PracticalConsiderationsand Responding to
Potential Criticisms
In light of the controversy surrounding the expansion of
unenumerated rights and the competing arguments for expanding
parental rights, the practical effect of the theory proposed in this Note
should be addressed. The first subsection of this Part attempts to
illustrate how the second tier of the parental liberty interest should be
applied and responds to the potential criticisms that the theory may
create a proverbial "slippery slope." The second and final subsection
addresses the fallacy behind the argument that because the liberty
interest does not involve private decisionmaking, it should not be
afforded constitutional protection.
1. The Two-Tiered Theory in Practice
Critics will undoubtedly resort to the familiar "slippery slope"
argument in denouncing the establishment of constitutional
protections for the relationship between a parent and adult child, no
matter how theoretically sound it is. They may argue, as did the First

supervision of an accredited agent of an educational organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A)(ii) or of a State or political subdivision of a State." 26 U.S.C. §151(c)(4)
(2004).
341. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 2004)

(adopted in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah).
342. See id.
343. BERNARD FARBER, FAMILY & KINSHIP IN MODERN SOCIETY 60 (1973) (noting that

twenty-one states have adopted such laws).
344. Id. at 59.
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Circuit in Ortiz,3 45 that to recognize the parent's interest would expose
states to suit in a myriad of inappropriate contexts.
One might suggest that the practical effect of the theory
proffered in this Note is difficult to discern because litigation of this
constitutional issue has arisen in the context of section 1983 suits, not
in the more familiar manner where substantive due process is
34 6
asserted as a defense to criminal prosecution or government action.
To illustrate how the second tier of the theory may arise in the more
familiar substantive due process context, one might consider the
following example. Suppose a state enacts a regulation that allows an
adult patient at any state-supported hospital to receive as a guest only
her spouse and minor children. The parent of such a patient may
contest such a law as unconstitutional, claiming it infringes on her
fundamental companionship interest. The state may attempt to justify
the regulation based on concerns for administrative ease and the
preservation of a patient's health by limiting contact with those
outside the hospital. In such a case, a court's job would be to
determine whether the proffered justifications are compelling and
narrowly tailored and therefore overcome the parent's claim of
familial autonomy.
Of more practical concern, however, is the possibility that
recognizing a parent's constitutional interest in the companionship of
an adult child could expose government actors and municipalities to
section 1983 liability for a myriad of legitimate actions that
unintentionally affect the liberty interest. The First Circuit
articulated this criticism in Ortiz, asserting that recognition of such
an interest could constitutionalize causes of action for a child's
wrongful discharge from a state job that forced a child's cross-country
move. 347 Upon closer inspection, however, these sorts of concerns do
not question whether the liberty interest is, in fact, fundamental.
Instead, they are more properly understood as questioning whether an
actor may violate due process through conduct not aimed at that
fundamental interest in the first place. The fact that a killing was
accidental as opposed to intentional, or was perpetrated by racial
animus as opposed to a desire to end the parent-child relationship, has
no bearing on whether the Constitution protects a parent's
relationship with her adult child. At most, these factors may be

345. See infra Part III.B.1.
346. See Wells & Eaton, supranote 139, at 223.
347. Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 9 (lst Cir. 1986)
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relevant in determining whether the hypothetical shooter has engaged
348
in unconstitutional conduct.
The courts denying constitutional protection of a parent's
interest in the companionship of an adult child have reasoned that the
Constitution does not protect abstract encroachment on familial
relationships but rather protects the right of family members to make
349
important, private decisions from being preempted by the state.
They point to protection of the decision to procreate, to school one's
child in religious as well as secular matters, and to select the family
with whom one chooses to live.3 50
The Ortiz court held that a
plaintiffs assertion that she has been deprived of her constitutionally
protected interest in the companionship of a relative who was fatally
beaten by prison guards "does not involve such a choice."3 51 That
court, however, seemed to confuse the secondary question of whether a
constitutional right has been violated with the question of whether the
underlying interest is afforded constitutional protection in the first
place.
Undoubtedly, there are circumstances where the state may
desire to preempt the decision of a parent and adult child to associate
with each other. The hypothetical hospital regulation discussed earlier
is one such example. 352 Yet it would be an odd result to prohibit the
state from preempting familial decisionmaking while allowing the
state to act to prevent family members from associating with one
another altogether. The liberty to marry, have children, and raise a
family mean little if the state may act, constitutionally, to destroy the
right to enjoy the family bond. The right to companionship is not
ancillary to those liberties but is just as fundamental to the family
rights protected by due process.

348. As mentioned at the outset of this Note, courts are split as to whether conduct that is
not targeted at the constitutionally protected parent-adult-child relationship violates the
Constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that negligent conduct does not trigger due
process, and it remains unresolved how much more culpability than mere negligence would
suffice to trigger a substantive due process violation. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347
(1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S 327, 328 (1986).
349. See, e.g., Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See infra discussion p. 148.
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CONCLUSION

In the Introduction, this Note questioned whether a parent can
bring a claim for the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest in the companionship of her son. 353 In arguing for a twotiered approach to determine the scope of the parental liberty interest,
this Note has provided an answer only to the first prong of the
question, concluding that there is a constitutionally protected parental
interest in the companionship of an adult child. Under the approach
advanced in this Note, the parental liberty interest alters in scope
during the two phases of a child's life. During a child's minor years,
the parental liberty interest contains the full constellation of rights.
The parent of such a minor child has a constitutionally protected
interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his
or her children. The scope of the parental liberty interest, however,
fundamentally changes as the child matures in adulthood. Many
liberties in the constellation would conflict with the adult child's own
constitutional liberty and autonomy. Under the second tier, therefore,
the parental liberty interest would extend only to the companionship
and care of the adult child, provided that a companionship
relationship had been developed before the occurrence of any state
action that may have limited it.
Though this Note arguably advances the expansion of
substantive due process, and for that reason could be viewed as
activist, it can also be viewed as conservative in that it furthers the
profound value that American society has placed on the intimacy of
family life. The two-tiered approach to the parental liberty interest
354
continues in the tradition of Supreme Court precedent on the family
and logically flows from the special rights and obligations imposed on
individuals by virtue of the relationship of a parent and her adult
child. 355 This Note also goes further and attempts to honor the
normative values of the family that the Court previously has
previously been unwilling to acknowledge explicitly. Once one views
the family unit not just in utilitarian terms of economic support or

353. See supra Part I.
354. For a thorough discussion of Supreme Court precedent on the family, see supra Part
II.B. See also Part IV.B.I for a discussion of the implications of precedent on the parental liberty
interest.
355. For a discussion on the legal tradition involving parents and adult children, see supra
Part IV.B.2.
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guardian, but as a source for emotional support and nurture, it makes
perfect sense to afford constitutional protection to the companionship
interest of a parent and her adult child.
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